Murray City v. Board of Education of Murray City School District : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Murray City v. Board of Education of Murray City
School District : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard C. Howe; Attorney for Appellant;
Dansie, Ellett & Hammill; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Murray City v. Board of Education, No. 10060 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4490
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTA~ L E D 
~IURRA Y CITY, a Municipal JUN 5 - 1964 
Corporation of the -----------·········-
State of Utah, -····· _ .. ·5~~~~~~ Court, ut.h 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
MURRAY CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, a Municipal 
Corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Def endant-AppelZant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10060 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, Utah 
Hon. A. H. Ellett, Judge 
DANSIE, ELLETT AND 
HAMMILL 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
RICHARD C. HOWE UNIVERSITY Of UlA.H 
.)'
155 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant OC11 1965 
'• 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE -------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------- 2 
A RG U l\ rENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
POINT I. SEWER CONNECTION AND SERVICE 
CHARGES ARE COMMERCIAL CONTRACT-
ED CHARGES AND ARE THE SAME AS ANY 
OTHER CONTRACTED CHARGE AND ARE 
NOT "TAXES" OR "ASSESSME'N'TS" FROM 
WHICH A SCHOOL DISTRICT IS EXEMPT 
FROM PAYING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
OR STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH.______ 4 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
AUTHORITIES 
Utah Constitutional Provisions : 
Article 13, Section 2 ------------------------------------------------
Statutes: 
U.C.A. 1953 Section 59-2-1 ------------------------------------
U.C.A. 1953 Section 53-4.:12 ------------------------------------
U.C.A. 1953 Section 17-6-3 
6 
6 
7 
9 
U.C.A. 1953 Section 17-3-3 ------------------------------------ 11 
~liscellaneous: 
Opinion Attorney General of Utah 60-029____________ 5 
60-072____________ 7 
62-021.___________ 4 
64 C.J.S. Section 1805 P.273 ------------------------------------ 12 
CASES CITED 
Salt Lake City vs. McGonagle, 38 Utah 277 112 Pac 
401 ( 1916) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
\Vey vs. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 504 101 Pac 381 ________ 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
State ex rei. Dunner vs. Graydon, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 
634 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Meyler vs. Meadville, 23 Pas Co. Ct. R. 119 ____________________ 8 
State vs. Salt Lake City Public Bd. of Edu., 13 Ut. 2nd 
56, 368 P .2nd 468 ---------------------------------------------------- 9 
City of Albuquerque, 29 Comp Gen 120 ( 1949) ______________ 11 
31 Comp Gen 405,408 (1952)______ 12 
Schmidt vs. Village of Kimberly, 256 P.2nd 515 (Ida 
1953) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, 39 A. 2nd 765 (1944) 13 
Town of Port Orchard vs. Kitsop County, 141 P.2nd 
151, (Wash 1943) ---------------------------------------------------- 13 
Grim vs. Village of Lewisville, 54 Ohio App. 270 6 
N .E. 2nd 998 ------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
Louisville vs. Joseph Seagrams & S., 307 Ky 413 211 
S.W. 2nd 122 (1948) ------------------------------------------------ 13 
Louisville vs. Barker, County Judge, 307 Ky 655, 2'12 
S.W. 2nd 122 (1948) ------------------------------------------------ 13 
Sanitation District #1 of Jefferson Co. vs. Campbell, 
249 S.W. 2nd 767 (1952 Ky) ------------------------------------ 14 
Vesil vs. Louisville, et al, 303 Ky 248, 197 S.W. 2nd 
413 ( 1946) ---------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
State vs. Taylor, 79 N.E. 2nd 1'27 (1948) Ohio____________ 14 
Repperger vs. City of Grand Rapids, 338 Mich 682, 
62 N.W. 2nd 585 -------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Oliver vs. Water Works and Sanitary Bd., 23 So. 2nd 
552 (Ala 1954) -------------------------------------------------------- 15 
In Re Philadelphia 340 Pa. 17, 16 A. 2nd 32 (1940) ---- 15 
Pa:tterson vs. City of Chattanooga, 241 S.W. 2nd 291 
( Tenn 1951) -------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Waterworks & Sanitary Bd. vs. Dean, 69 So. 2nd 704 
(Ala 1954) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 15 
Laverents vs. Cheyenne, 217 P. 2nd 877, (1950 Wyo)__ 15 
Michelson vs. City of Grand Island, 48 N.W. 2nd 769 
( 1951) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
MURRAY CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, a Municipal 
Corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RE1SPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10060 
STATEMENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover delinquent sewer 
charges. The Defendant counterclaimed seeking a 
declaratory judgment that it was exempt from the 
payment of the charges. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on a stipul,ation of facts and 
judgment rendered for the Plaintiff for charges 
to September 30, 1963 in the sum of $8,593.25. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal and a judgment stat-
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ing the School District is exempt from payment of 
sewer service charges. 
ST~TE'ME~NT OF FACTS 
The Plainiff is a municipal corporation and a 
second class city owning and operating a sewer 
system within its corporate limits. Defendant is a 
body ~orporate with its boundaries coinciding with 
those of the Plaintiff. Prior to September, 19'52, 
the Plaintiff's sewer system served only approxi-
m~ately one-third of the city's homes and businesses. 
Plaintiff had no treatment plant, but treated the 
sewage in city owned septic tanks. On September 
5, 1'9152, the electors of the city at a special election 
authorized the issuance of $1,300,000 of water and 
sewer revenue bonds to provide for the construction 
of extensions and improvements to the city's water 
plant and sewer system. The sewer system was 
thereafter greatly expanded to serve most of the 
city's dwellings and commercial buildings, and a 
sewage treatment plant was constructed to treat 
sewage collected from the en tire system. 
Mter the system was extended, persons making 
connections thereto were charged 1a connection fee 
in accordance with a schedule adopted by city ordin-
ance (See Section 3 of the attached copy of Ordin-
ance 56 as amended for the connection fees being 
currently charged). Persons who were already con-
nected to the system paid no such fee, but new and 
old ·connectors 1alike were and are presently required 
to pay a monthly service charge, the current rates 
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being shown in Section 2 of the attached copy of 
Ordinance 56 as amended. Defendant now has 10 
~chool buildings and one administrative building 
connected to the Plaintiff's sewer system. 'The De-
fendant paid the monthly service charge of five 
cents per child until the Attorney General of Utah 
in an opinion issued on or about November 8, 1'960, 
rules that the State of Utah was not obligated to 
pay fees for connection of a State owned building 
to a municipal sewer sys tern. Upon the authority 
of that opinion the Defendant refused to pay for 
the service charges and connection fees, and the 
Plaintiff brought suit to recover all delinquent 
charges. 
The service charges and connection fees collect-
ed by the Plaintiff are placed in a separate fund 
and used for the payment of opei'Iation and main-
tenance costs and the payment of principal and in-
terest falling due on the revenue bonds issued to 
Lnance construction of the extension to the system 
in ln52. The balance remaining after the payment 
of those costs has been used in recent years to help 
finance capital in1provements to the system, includ-
ing expansion of the capacity of the treatment plant. 
Howevel', in some former years the balance in the 
fund at the end of the year was transferred to the 
general fund of the city. 
A copy of the Plaintiff's ordinance authoriz-
ing issuance of revenue bonds to defray the costs of 
extending the city's sewer and water system is at-
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ached and made part of this statement of facts. 
Also, the pleadings of the parties hereto are incorp-
orated herein and made part of this statement of 
facts. 
ARGUME'N'T 
POINT I. 
SE1WER CONNECTION AND SERVICE CHARGES 
.NRE CO'M'MERCIA'L CONTRACTED CHARGES AND 
ARE THE SA1ME AS A!NY OTHER CONTRACTED 
CHARGE AND ARE NOT "TAXES" OR "ASSE'SS-
MEN'M" FROM WHICH A SCHOOL DISTRI1CT IS EX-
EMPT FROM PAYING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
OR STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
:The office of the Attorney General A. Pratt 
Kesler and his assistants, Roland G. Robinson Jr. 
and Ronald N. Boyce under date of Mrarch 12, 196'2 
in an opinion numbered #62-021 researched this 
question most thoroughly. The question as to whether 
these charges were "taxes" or "assessments" and 
whether the School District was exempt from pay-
ment of the same by construction of the Statutes of 
the State of Utah 1and its Constitution and existing 
cases were carefully considered. We shall quote ex-
tensively later on from that opinion inasmuch as 
it develops our position step by step. The opinion 
discusses ·2 previous opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral's office and why they were in error in holding 
for the position espoused by the Defendant Appel-
lant. 
Defendant suggests that since both parties 'are 
tax supported with co-existing boundaries, no tax-
payer will suffer any detriment if the School Dis-
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trict is exempt from payment of the service. Even 
if that were so, these facts will not apply except in 
this case because there are many cases where the 
boundaries are varied. The question should be held 
strictly to the liability to pay the charge. Such an 
accounting fiction as Defendants request would ren-
der it impossible to truly determine the costs of 
rarious governmental or ·taxing units. With the 
healthy bite school districts are taking from the tax 
apple, undoubtedly they or anyone similarly situ-
ated would like to shift some expenses elsewhere. 
Also, why not say they should be exempt from pay-
ing charges for lights, 'heat, supplies, etc. The source 
providing the service is not the important question, 
it is whether or not it is a cont:r"~actual arrangement 
the same as any other purchases by the School Dis-
trict. 
If a School District was not required to pay for 
lights, gas, water, sewer or other services, those 
municipalities, persons, or corporations providing 
the same would surely see that they were not made 
a\·ailable unless they were to be compensated as fron1 
other recipients. Can we require services to be pro-
vided gratuitiously without taking property (value) 
from one and giving it to another? Supposing private 
capital provided these services, could we require 
gratuitous services for the School District? 
Now, let us proceed with the opinion of the 
rtah Attorney General #62-0211 . 
.. The question presented is whether a school 
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district may be held to pay for the 1actual cost of con-
necting to a sewer line of a sewer district, and 
whether it may be charged for the services that are 
provided. Article XIII, Section ·2, of the Utah Con-
stitution provides: 
'~The property of the state, counties, cities, 
towns, school districts, municipal corporations 
~and public libraries * * * shall be exempt from 
taxation.'' 
Section 5·9-2-1, U. C.A. 1953, also provides : 
"The propertiy of the United States, of this 
state, counties, cities, towns, school districts, 
municipal corporations * * * shall be exempt 
from taxation." 
It appears clear, therefore, that the property 
of schodl districts is not subject to tax. In ~addition, 
Section 153-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, provides that school 
board property is exempt from special assessment. 
The matter thus resolves itself into a question of 
whether the payment of connection fees and sewer 
service charges are taxes or special assessment. If 
they 1are, they may not be assessed against the school 
districts; if they are not, the school district can be 
compelled to pay: 
1. Two opinions previously issued by the of-
fice of the Attorney General have held that such 
charges are taxes and hence cannot be imposed. 
(Nos. 60-07'2 and 60-029.) 
The only per tin en t case cited in these opinions 
is the case of Sbate ex rel, Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City v. McGonagle, 38 Utah 277, 112 Pac. 
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401 (1910) cited in No. 60-072. In this case, the 
Board of Education brought a mandamus action 
against the Salt Lake City Engineer to compel him 
to allow the Board to connect a school building with 
a city sewer. The City Engineer had refused to issue 
the permit until the City paid a special assessment 
levied against the school property for the construc-
tion of the sewer. In this case, the. School Board 
tendered the connection or permit fee ; 38 · U tab 2'77 
at 278, the Court said: 
"We think it equally clear that the lands own-
ed by the Board are exempt from local assess-
ment or special taxation for the construction 
of a public sewer * * *" 
The basis of the court's opinion was that this 
constituted a tax. The decision was based on a simi-
lar holding of the court in W ey vs. Salt Lake City, 
35 Utah 504, 101 Pac. 381, holding assessments for 
street improvements to "be invalid. Both of the deci-
sions relied upon Comp. Laws of Utah, 1907, Sec. 
l~);i:~. which is the same as Section 5'3-4-12, U.C.A. 
195:i, which provides.: 
"All property real and personal held by any 
board of education shall be exempt from gen-
eral and special taxation, and from al'l local 
asessments for any purpose, and no such pro-
perty shall be taken in any manner for debts." 
Thus, the cases were concerned with a particu-
lar statute exempting the property of school dis-
tricts from special or general taxation, but not with 
the question of connection fees per se, since in the 
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case before the court the fee was tendered, However, 
as to connection charges it was said: 
"It, however, is urged, that though the pro-
perty was exempt and the assessment invalid 
still, the city being the owner of the sewer, 
could lawfully impose the payment of areas-
ona:ble charge before it was required to per-
mit the board to connect with or use the sewer 
and that the payment of ninety-eight dollars, 
the amount of the assessment by the board 
for the use of this sewer was a reasonable 
charge. The legislature has seen fit to exempt 
all property of the board, both real and per-
sonal, from special taxation and all local as-
sessments, for any purpose. Since the property 
was not subject to the assessment, and the 
levy for that reason invalid and the assess-
ment unenforceable, to then permit the muni-
cipality to impose as a condition of tapping 
and making a connection with the public sewer 
the payment of a charge for the use of the 
sewer, is to allow the municipality to do in-
direc~ly what it cannot do directly. (State 
ex rei. Dunner vs. Graydon, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
R. 6'34, Meyler vs. Meadville, 23 Pa. Co. Ct. 
R. 1'19.) 
The case is not clear as to whether the court 
was in effect saying you cannot disguise a tax as 
a connection charge, or whether it was saying that 
the charges of any kind could not be imposed. It is 
certain that the opinion did not deal with day-to-
day reasonable service charges necessitated by the 
connection. It appears more suggestive from the 
language of the court that it was an ~attempt to do 
"indirectly what could not be done directly," that 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court was concerned with fraud or sham and 
not actual related expenses. The briefs filed in the 
case have apparently been lost, nor are copies of 
the two decisions relied upon by the Supreme Court 
available in the State Law Library. It seems more 
likely, however, that the decision only purported to 
cover taxation. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court recently decided 
in State vs. Salt Lake City Public Board of Eduo,a-
tion, Case No. 9492, January ·5, 1962, that the state 
must pay compen'Sation for taking of school board 
property for highway use. Analogous to that case 
is the situation of sewer and water districts, since 
if a school board were allowed to compel connection 
with a sewer line and use its capacity or require an 
expanded capacity, it would in effect be 'sanctioning 
the taking of the property or money of a sewer dis-
trict without compensation therefor. 
3. It is submitted that the Utah Supreme 
Court has not directly decided the question of wheth-
er the actual costs of connection and a reasonable 
service charge, directly related to the 1actual expenses 
incurred in providing the sewer facility, may be 
charged by a sewer district against a school district. 
Section 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"'Vithout in any way limiting the powers 
hereinabove reposed in districts created under 
this act, it is expressly provided that each such 
district shall have: 
* * * 
(c) The power to enter in to such con tracts 
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as are considered desirable by the board to 
carry out the functions of the district, includ-
ing specifically the power to enter into con-
tracts with municipal corporations, or other 
public corporations, or district, and any coun-
ty municipal corporation, or any other public 
corporation or districts, shall have the power 
to enter into contracts with districts created 
under this act for the purpose of constructing, 
acquiring or operating all or any part of a 
system for the collection, treatment tand dis-
position of sewage. * * * 
(d) The power to impose and collect charges 
for water or other services or facilities af-
forded by the district to its consumer's and to 
pledge all or any part of the revenues so de-
rived to the payment of any bonds of the dis-
trict. * * * 
It would appear that the Le'gisiature intended 
that water and sewer districts be allowed to enter 
into contracts with public districts ('school districts) 
and to charge for their actual services. If so, the 
Legislature could hardly have intended Section 
53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, to have racted as a cloak of 
immunity since it would be inconsistent with what 
is expressed and implied by Section 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 
1953. 'Therefore, it may be said that the legislative 
in tent was to allow reasonable service charges to 
defray actual expenses. 
As noted before, no judici1al decision by the 
Utah Court has been rendered on this exact prob-
lem; the McGonagle case notwithstanding. In addi-
tion, the McGonagle case was decided before Sec-
10 
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tion 17-3-3.8, U. C.A. 1953, was ena:cted. Laws of 
Utah, 1953, Ch. 28, Sec. 2. 
It is further submitted that the great weight 
of legal authority is against the proposition urged 
by the previous Attorney Generals' opinions. The 
general rule is noted in 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corpor-
ations, Sec. 1805, p. 273: 
"A charge for the use of or connection with 
a sewer system has been held a charge for 
special benefits received, or a method of pay-
ing for the construction. Such a charge, or a 
charge for sewer services, or a rental charge 
is under most authorities not a 'tax or an as-
sessment.'' 
Thus, if this is a correct statement of law, Sec-
tion 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, offers no objection to 
the charge of a reasonable rental. Other authorities 
are in accord. In 9 Comp. Gen. 41 (1929), the Comp-
troller General of the United States ruled that the 
City of Portland could charge the United States 
for the privilege of a VA Hospital connecting on to 
a city sewer system, and ruled that the same was 
not a tax. It was said: 
"The amount charged to the Government for 
the priYilege of connecting with the city sewer 
cannot be said under the above definition 
(citing 123 U.S., 288) to have been in the 
nature of a tax.'' 
The same rullng resulted concerning the right 
of the U.S. Indian Agency to connect to the City of 
Albuquerque; 29 Comp. Gen. 120 (1949). Subse-
11 
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quently, in 31 Comp. Gen. 405, 408 ( 1'952), it was ) 
stated: 
"It has been held that the Constitutional im-
munity of the FedeDal government from state 
and local taxation does not extend to payment 
of charges for water or sewer services where 
the amount thereof is determined pursuant to 
statute by the quantity of water furnished or 
the amount of sewage disposed of, such 
charges being neither regarded as taxes or 
assessments, but as the price of the product or 
service rendered.'' 
This is also in ~accord with the general statement 
found in 64 C.J.S., Municipa:l Corporations, Sec. 
1'805, p. 273, where it is said: 
"A distinction has been made between the ac-
tual use of the facilities with knowledge of 
the rates charged, in which case the charges 
are not taxes, or a substitute for taxes, and 
not an exercise of the taxing power, but an 
obligation resting on contract, and the imposi-
tion of a charge with no regard to the extent 
or value of the use made of the sewer facili-
ties or whether any use is m~ade, in which case 
the charge is in legal effect a tax, the obliga-
tion to pay it being created only by the exer-
cise of the taxing power.'' 
The cases from the great majority of jurisdic-
tion support this conclusion. Thus, in Schmidt vs. 
Village of Kimberly, 256 P. 2d 515 (Ida. 1953), 
it was said: 
"The charges made for water and sewer ser-
vice are not taxes." 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Opi-
12 
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nion of Justices, 39 A 2d 765 (1944) said: 
"In accordance with the weight of authority, 
we hold that sewer rents imposed by the City 
of Concord are neither taxes nor 1assessments 
for a local benefit hut, like water rates are 
charges made for a service rendered-charges 
which the consumer, by accepting the service, 
impliedly agrees to pay." 
The Court further said: 
"This rule is not restricted to priv:ate consum-
ers but extends unquestionable to the State 
where the officials who accept the service 
have the power to act in the matter." 
See also Town of Port Orchard vs. Kitsop Coun-
ty, 141 P. '2d 151, '(Wash. 1943), (im·plied power 
to require county to pay "reasonable fee") . 
In Grim vs. Village of Lewisville, 54 Ohio App. 
270, & N.E. 2d 998, it was held that such sewer 
charges were not "special assessments". 
The same result was recognized in Louisville 
l's. Joseph Seagrams & S., 307 Ky. 413, 2t1 S.W. 
2d 122 ( 1948) . The court said: 
.. All of the authorities agree that special 
charges of this kind are not taxes, but rents 
for the use of sewers, or in some instances but 
a method of paying for their construction." 
(Citing authority). 
In Louisville vs. Barker, County Judge, 307 Ky. 
()35, 21:2 S.\V. 2d 122, (1948), the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals, in construing a statute similar to Sec-
tion 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 1953, as against a claim of 
immunity by the county, said: 
13 
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uThe scope of the power del ega ted by the 
Legislature to the District in this particular 
is ,a;ll embraeing. It is authorized not only 
to fix or establish a schedule of rates and 
charges, but to collect them 'from at! the real 
property served by the facilities.' KRS, 
76.090 ( 1). ·There is no exemption or exclu-
sion of any property of the county. To say 
that the county's pToperty is excluded we 
would have to read into the statute something 
that the LegisLature did not put into it. As 
we have pointed out, sewer rental charges 
are not taxes or special assessments, 'but pos-
sess commercial characteristics. Therefore, 
there is no apparent reason to construe the 
completely comprehensive language as not 
meaning just what it says, under general con-
ceptions of a lack of_ power of one govern-
mental agency to impose burdens on another 
in the absence of a positively expressed right." 
See also; Sanitation District No. 1 of Jefferson 
County vs. Oampbell, 249 S.W. 2d 767 (19'52 Ky.); 
~asil vs. Louisville, .et al, 303 Ky. 248, 197 S.W. 
2d 41'3 (T946). -
In State vs. Taylor, _ 79 N.E. 2d 127 ( 1948), 
the Ohio Supreme Court said: 
"This case does not present a situation where 
the city is endeavoring to tax property be-
longing to the State of Ohio, since it is well 
established that charges for sewer services, 
or so-cal'led rental charges are neither taxes 
nor assessments." 
Other cases would merely make excessive the 
length of the memorandum, but several other cases 
14 
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have followed the a:bove precedents. See: Repperge·r 
vs. City of Grand Rapids, 3'38 Mich. 682, 62 N.W. 
2d 585 ( 1'954) , (Sewer charges not a tax) ; Oliver 
1'.~. Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board, 73 So. 
2d 552 ( 1954, Ala.) ; In Re Philadelphia, 340 Pa. 
17, 16 A.2d 32 (1940); Patterson vs. City of Chatta-
n()oga, 241 S.W. 2d 291 (Tenn., 1951); Waterworks 
and Sanitary Bd. vs. D.ean, 69 So. 12d 704 (1954, 
Ala.); Laverents vs. Cheyenne, 217 P.2d 8717 (1950, 
\Vyo.) ; Michelsen vs. City of Grand Island, 4'8 N.W. 
2d 769 (1951). 
4. The only important opinion of the Attorney 
General is No. 60-072, since it is the only opinion 
purporting to concern itself with the exact problem. 
The error in this opinion is first, it fails to consider 
the effect of Section 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 1953, or 
whether that statute has overruled the McGonagle 
case; second, it assumes that connection fees are 
assessments based on the McGonagle language 
which is not directly pertinent; and third, the opi-
nion does not consider whether day to day service 
charges or reasonable rentals may be charged, nor 
does the McGonagle case. 
It is the opinion of this office, for the reasons 
here set forth, that payment of both reasonable 
connection fees and reasonable ren ta'l and service 
charges for sewer service may be required of school 
distl'icts." 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities and an-
alysis of the f~acts and the relationship between the 
parties it is the Respondent's contention that the 
Defendant's should be required to pay for sewer 
services the same as if it were any other utility or 
contractual relationship between strangers. Surely 
the law adequately provides for the raising of rev-
enues to supply school districts and it is not necessary 
that they rely on enforced charitable contributions 
whether from another tax supported body or from 
any individual or corporation. 
Respectfully sub1ni tted, 
DANSIE, ELLETT AND 
HAMMILL 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff -Respondent 
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